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A REASON TO REVISIT MAINE'S INDIAN CLAIMS
SETTLEMENT ACTS: THE UNITED NATIONS
DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES
Nicole Friederichs*
I. Introduction
In April 2008, seven months after the United Nations adopted the
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), Maine's state
legislature passed a Joint Resolution in "support" of the landmark document.1
In the wake of the United States' original vote against its adoption, Maine
thereupon became the only state in the union to mark its support of the
UNDRIP.2 In the year prior to the Joint Resolution, however, each of Maine's
four federally recognized Indian tribes' were involved in lawsuits against the
State of Maine. The lawsuits challenged the tribes' authority to self-govern,
and thereby threatened their cultural and spiritual life.4 The tribes ultimately
lost, and the decisions issued by the First Circuit Court of Appeals amounted
to a limitation on the tribes' ability to self-govern.
* Nicole Friederichs is an attorney specializing in federal Indian law, indigenous peoples
rights, and international human rights law. She holds an LL.M. in Indigenous Peoples Law &
Policy from the University of Arizona, a J.D. from Suffolk University Law School, and is a
graduate of Mount Holyoke College and the London School of Economics.
1. See H.P. 1681, 123rd Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Me. 2008) [hereinafter Joint Resolution].
2. The United States recently reversed its position on the Declaration, announcing its
support for the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples on December 16, 2010.
See Remarks by the President at the White House Tribal Nations Conference, THE WHrE
HOUSE (Dec. 16, 2010, 9:39 AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/16/
remarks-president-white-house-tribal-nations-conference.
3. The four tribes are the Houlton Band ofMaliseet Indians, Aroostook Band ofMicmacs,
Penobscot Indian Nation, and the Passamaquoddy Tribe. The Passamaquoddy Tribe has two
locations (Indian Township and Pleasant Point), each with separate tribal councils but also
represented by a joint tribal council. 75 Fed. Reg. 60,810 (Oct. 1, 2010); About the
Passamaquoddy Tribe, PASSAMAQUODDY.COM, http://www.passamaquoddy.com/splashpage.
html (last visited Feb. 26, 2011) ("The Passamaquoddy Tribe, having two locations, is
represented by the Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe, each tribe with separate
councils in Indian Township and at Pleasant Point Reservation.").
4. See Maine v. Johnson, 498 F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 2007); Aroostook Band of Micmacs
v. Ryan, 484 F.3d 41, 43 (1st Cir. 2007); Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians v. Ryan, 484 F.3d
73, 74 (1st Cir. 2007).
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The Maine tribes, along with many of the other New England tribes, find
themselves in a class separate from the majority of the more than five hundred
federally recognized Indian tribes in the United States.' State and federal
legislation settling Indian land claims and creating unique jurisdictional
relationships between the State of Maine and the tribes is at the core of what
makes the Maine tribes different. Although the federal settlement legislation
contains language supporting the sovereignty of the tribes, Maine's and the
courts' narrow interpretation of those statutes makes it difficult for tribal
governments to serve and protect their peoples, lands, and culture.
By highlighting the 2007 First Circuit decisions, this article examines the
current status of Maine tribes under two provisions of the UNDRIP. The first
provision pertains to the right to self-determination' - a right that encompasses
self-government. The second provision concerns the duty of governments to
consult with indigenous peoples on all decisions "that may affect them," with
the goal of gaining their consent.7 Part II of this article reviews the
development of indigenous peoples' rights within international human rights
law. It examines the adoption of the UNDRIP and discusses its current legal
status. Part III addresses the right to self-determination, reviewing its
applicability to indigenous peoples, as well as whether this right is respected
and protected in Maine. Focusing on two almost identical cases, Aroostook
Band ofMicmacs v. Ryan and Houlton Band ofMaliseet Indians v. Ryan, Part
III examines whether the Micrnac and Maliseet Indian tribes are able to
exercise their right to self-determination under the courts' interpretation of the
settlement acts. Part IV addresses the duty to consult and free, prior, and
informed consent by highlighting a case involving the Penobscot and
Passamaquoddy tribes: Maine v. Johnson. This section discusses whether the
State of Maine is fulfilling its obligations to consult with the tribes on matters
that may affect them, and examines when consent is required prior to action.
In Part V, this article concludes that Maine's treatment and the courts'
interpretation of the settlement acts do not meet international human rights
standards - or, for that matter, federal Indian law principles and federal
government policies.
5. 75 Fed. Reg. 60,810 (Oct. 1, 2010) ("This notice publishes the current list of 564 tribal
entities recognized and eligible for funding and services from the Bureau of Indian affairs by
virtue of their status as Indian tribes."); 75 Fed. Reg. 66,124 (Oct. 27, 2010) (adding the
Shinnecock Indian Nation to the list of federally recognized tribes, bringing the total number
to 565).
6. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, art.
3, U.N. Doc. A/RiES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter UNDRIP].
7. Id. art. 19.
[Vol. 35498
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol35/iss2/3
No. 2] A REASON TO REVISIT MAINE'S SETTLEMENTACTS
Although this article argues for the customary international law status of the
right to self-determination and the duty to consult (thereby placing legally
binding obligations on States),' the intent is not to conduct a thorough analysis
of whether the UNDRIP, as a whole or through its individual provisions,
amounts to customary international law. Instead, the primary purpose of this
article is to juxtapose Maine's and the United States' support of the UNDRIP
with Maine's treatment of its tribes. Given the incongruity of this treatment,
coupled with the failure of the settlement acts to ensure the recognition and
protection of rights afforded to the tribes under international human rights law
and federal Indian law, the UNDRIP provides an opportunity to revisit the
settlements with Maine's Indian tribes to ensure that the tribes rights are
respected. As the United States announced in its recent statement reversing its
position on the UNDRIP, the UNDRIP "expresses [the] aspirations of the
United States . . . to improve our laws and policies."' The laws settling the
Maine Indian land claims are examples of where improvements are needed to
meet international legal obligations.
II. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
The UNDRIP passed on September 13, 2007, by an overwhelming majority
of the United Nations General Assembly.'o One hundred and forty-four
member States voted in favor of the UNDRIP, only eleven abstained, and only
four (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States) voted against it.
Two States that originally abstained have since announced their support of the
UNDRIP," and with the December 2010 announcement of support by the
8. The use of the term "States" refers to nations, and not to individual states of the United
States of America. Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, treaties and
customary international law are binding not only on the federal government, but also on state
and local governments. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFFOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111 (1987).
The Joint Resolution characterizes the UNDRIP as "nonbinding" and "express[es] support" for
the UNDRIP by the Legislature. Joint Resolution, supra note 1. Whether the resolution has the
force of Maine state law seems to be answered in the negative. City of Bangor v. Inhabitants
of Etna, 34 A.2d 205, 208 (Me. 1943) ("A joint resolution or resolve, is often merely a rule or
order for the guidance of the agents and servants of the government."); see also Moulton v.
Scully, 89 A. 944, 952-53 (Me. 1917).
9. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, Announcement of U.S. Support for the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 1 (Dec. 16, 2010), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/153223.pdf [hereinafter U.S. 2010 Statement].
10. UNDRIP, supra note 6, pmbl.
11. See Special Rapporteur, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation ofHuman
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United States, all of the States that initially voted against the UNDRIP now
officially endorse it.'2
Although Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States now
support the UNDRIP, they nonetheless remain firm in their stance that it is
legally nonbinding." While Canada and the United States assert that the
UNDRIP is not part of customary international law,14 Australia and New
Zealand instead aver that parts of the UNDRIP represent fundamental human
rights of indigenous peoples already recognized under international law, while
other parts "express[] new, and non-binding, aspirations."" It is this latter
perspective that is shared by legal scholars: the UNDRIP is technically
nonbinding on States, but some of its provisions reflect existing and binding
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, Addendum, 7, U.N. Doc. No.
A/HRC/15/37/Add.3 (May 25, 2010); UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, United
Nations Declaration on the Rights oflndigenous People, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/
en/declaration.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2011) (noting that both Columbia and Samoa reversed
their position).
12. See Jenny Macklin, Statement on the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, 2 (Apr. 3, 2009), http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfli/documents/Australiaofficial
statementendorsementUNDRIP.pdf [hereinafter Australia Statement]; Press Release, Dr. Pita
Sharples, Announcement of New Zealand's Support for the Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (Apr.20,2010), availableathttp://www.beehive.govt.nzlrelease/supporting
+un+declaration+restores+nz039s+mana [hereinafter New Zealand Statement]; Canada 's
Statement ofSupport on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights ofIndigenous Peoples,
INDIAN & N. AFFAIRS CANADA (Nov. 12, 2010), available at http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ap/
ia/dcl/stmt-eng.asp [hereinafter Canada Statement]; U.S. 2010 Statement, supra note 9, at 1.
13. In addition to these four States, several other States expressed their opinion that the
UNDRIP represents a nonbinding document. See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 107th plen.
mtg. at 22, U.N. Doc. A/61/PV.107, (Sept. 13, 2007) (statement of the United Kingdom)
(emphasizing the nonbinding nature of the UNDRIP); id at 26 (statement of Guyana) (noting
that the UNDRIP is "political in character, as opposed to being a legally binding document");
U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 108th plen. mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. A/61/PV.108 (Sept. 13, 2007)
(statement ofNepal) (explaining their understanding of the UNDRIP as not creating any legally
binding obligations).
14. Canada Statement, supra note 12 ("Although the Declaration is a non-legally binding
document that does not reflect customary international law nor change Canadian laws, our
endorsement gives us the opportunity to reiterate our commitment to continue working in
partnership with Aboriginal peoples in creating a better Canada."); U.S. 2010 Statement, supra
note 9, at 1 ("The United States supports the Declaration, which - while not legally binding
or a statement of current international law - has both moral and political force.").
15. New Zealand Statement, supra note 12 ("The Declaration is an affirmation of accepted
international human rights and also expresses new, and non-binding, aspirations."); see also
Australia Statement, supra note 12, at 3 ("Australia's existing obligations under international
human rights treaties are mirrored in the Declaration's fundamental principles.").
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customary international law." As chronicled below, this is in part because the
UNDRIP is but one chapter in a long history of international legal
development of indigenous peoples' issues and rights.
Even before the UNDRIP was adopted, several international and regional
human rights bodies addressed the rights of indigenous peoples, thereby
contributing to the development of international norms on indigenous peoples'
rights. For example, the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (CERD), the monitoring body for the International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Convention),
released a General Recommendation on indigenous peoples in 1997. It called
on States to "combat and eliminate [] discrimination" against indigenous
peoples by "[p]rovid[ing] [them] with conditions allowing for a sustainable
economic and social development compatible with their cultural characteristics
[and] [e]nsur[ing] that [they] have equal rights in respect of effective
participation in public life and that no decisions directly relating to their rights
and interests are taken without their informed consent." 7 During the periodic
review process, at which States report to the Convention on their
implementation efforts, CERD has increasingly sought information on
indigenous peoples, and, in its concluding observations, commented on their
status. '
16. In its recent report on the UNDRIP, the International Law Association (ILA) explained
that, in addition to customary international law, the UNDRIP also "represents an essential
prerequisite in order for States to comply with some of the obligations provided for by the UN
Charter." INT'L LAW ASS'N, THE HAGUE CONFERENCE: RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 5
(2010), available at http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/draft-committee-reports-the-hague-
2010.cfm (follow "Rights of Indigenous Peoples" hyperlink) [hereinafter ILA REPORT]. In
making this statement, the ILA quoted an interpretation from the Office of Legal Affairs of the
United Nations, which clarified that "in United Nations practice, a 'declaration' is a solemn
instrument resorted to only in very rare cases relating to matters of major and lasting importance
where maximum compliance is expected." Id. The ILA also noted that "in adopting [the
UNDRIP), the General Assembly was '[gluided by the purposes and principles of the Charter
of the United Nations, and good faith in the fulfilment of the obligations assumed by States in
accordance with the Charter."' Id.
17. CERD, General Recommendation 23, on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Annex V,
at 122, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/52/18 (Aug. 18, 1997).
18. See, e.g., CERD, Concluding Observations of the Comm. on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, Republic of Congo, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/COG/CO/9 (Mar. 23, 2009); CERD,
Concluding Observations of the Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Ecuador,
U.N. Doc. CERD/C/ECU/CO/19 (Aug. 15, 2008); Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination, United States of America, U.N. Doc. A/56/18, GAOR 56th Sess., Supp.
No. 18, at 64 In 380-82 (2001); CERD, Concluding Observations of the Comm. on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Australia, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/304/ADD. 101 (Apr. 19,
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The Organization of American States' human rights regime also has
contributed to the jurisprudence of indigenous peoples' rights in a significant
manner. Both the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights have reported on or adjudicated
complaints from indigenous communities. For example, in 2002, the Inter-
American Commission released a report on a land claims petition from the
Western Shoshone Nation, an indigenous community located in Nevada.
Citing CERD's General Recommendation, the Draft American Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and the jurisprudence of the U.N. Human
Rights Committee, the Inter-American Commission examined the "developing
norms and principles governing the human rights of indigenous peoples."l 9 Of
particular relevance to that case, the Inter-American Commission discussed the
general international legal principle that recognizes the collective ownership
rights of indigenous peoples.20
In the year prior, the Inter-American Court issued its landmark decision,
Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua.2 1 In this seminal
case, the Inter-American Court held that the right to property under the
American Convention on Human Rights included the communal land rights
of indigenous communities, and, as a result, the rights must be recognized and
protected by the State.22 Since the decision, the court has continued to develop
its body of jurisprudence on indigenous peoples rights,23 and is cited as legal
support by international and regional human rights bodies faced with
indigenous rights cases.24
2000).
19. Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 75/02,
OEA/Ser.LV/II. 117, doc. I rev. 1 T 124 (2002).
20. Id. T 130.
21. Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79 (August
31, 2001).
22. Id. 122.
23. See Saramaka People v. Suriname, Interpretation of the Judgment of Preliminary
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 185 (Aug.
12, 2008); Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146 (Mar. 29, 2006); Yakye Axa Indigenous
Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 125 (June 17, 2005); Moiwana Community v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124 (June 15, 2005).
24. See, e.g., Centre for Minority Rights Dev.(Kenya) and Minority Rights Group Int'l on
behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, 276/2003 African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights passim (Feb. 2010), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/category,
LEGAL,ACHPR,CASELAW,,4b8275al2,0.html. CERD also relied on the Inter-American
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Finally, the International Labour Organization's Convention No. 169
Concerning the Rights of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (ILO No. 169)25 is
another example of international practice of recognizing indigenous peoples'
rights. Adopted in 1989 by members of the ILO, twenty-two States have since
signed on to the binding treaty.2 6 ILO No. 169 provides rights similar to the
UNDRIP, such as consultation," control of lands and natural resources, and
access to health and education.2 8 The role of ILO No. 169 "as a powerful
catalyst for the consolidation at the international level of the common
normative understanding regarding the rights of indigenous peoples" was
recently recognized by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous
peoples.2 9
It is these decisions and treaties, as well as the internal practices of States,
on which professors James Anaya and Siegfried Wiessner rely to argue for the
"customary international law character of individual key parts of the
[UNDRIP] or of principles embedded in it.""o Anaya and Wiessner are not
alone in this conclusion. In addition to the statements made by States such as
New Zealand,3 ' Australia,2 Ecuador, and Namibia,34 the International Law
Commission's Dann Report in its decision on the Western Shoshone. See Decision 1(68)
(United States ofAmerica), U.N. ESCOR, CERD, 68th Sess., U.N. Doc. CERD/C/USA/DEC/1
(Apr. 11, 2006).
25. Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, I.L.O.
Conv. 169, I.L.O., 76th Sess., reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1382 (1989) [hereinafter ILO 169].
26. Convention No. 169, ILOLEX, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/ratifce.pl?C 169 (last
visited Feb. 26, 2011).
27. ILO 169, supra note 25, art. 6.
28. Id. art. 7.
29. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation ofHuman
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, S. James Anaya, 33, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/9/9 (Aug. 11, 2008).
30. S. James Anaya & Siegfried Wiessner, The UN Declaration on the Rights ofIndigenous
Peoples: Towards Re-empowerment, JUIST (Oct. 3, 2007), http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/
2007/10/un-declaration-on-rights-of-indigenous.php. Professor Anaya, who has written
extensively in this area of law, is the current U.N. Special Rapporteur on the rights of
indigenous peoples. Professor Wiessner is chair of the International Law Association's
Committee on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
31. See generally New Zealand Statement, supra note 12.
32. See generally Australia Statement, supra note 12.
33. See U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 108th plen. mtg. at 10, U.N. Doc. A/61/PV.108 (Sept. 13,
2007) (statement of Ecuador) (stating that Ecuador "congratulates the General Assembly on
having met the historic challenge of incorporating into international human rights law a
fundamental instrument for ending the exclusion, marginalization and obscurity of millions of
human beings who for centuries have been traditionally exploited and humiliated and who
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Association, a global organization whose mission is "the study, clarification
and development of international law,"" recently stated that "[i]mportant
norms expressed in [the UNDRIP] can also be found in the other traditional
source of international law: customary international law.", 6
Assessing the accuracy ofthis conclusion and determining which provisions
of the UNDRIP amount to customary international law is beyond the scope of
this article. But establishing the "customary international law character" of the
right to self-determination and a State's duty to consult with indigenous
peoples supports this article's proposition that the Maine settlement acts
should be amended to reflect those international human rights norms. Worth
addressing, briefly, is whether, under the persistent objector rule, the United
States is immune from the application of the UNDRIP's provisions that are
customary in nature.
Under the persistent objector rule, "if a [S]tate objects to the establishment
of a norm while it is becoming law and persistently objects up to the present,
it is exempt from that norm."" As a result, the timing of the objection is
relevant, because if a norm "has already crystallized into customary
[international] law," the persistent objector rule does not apply.3 8 Though
determining the date when a norm becomes part of binding international law
is difficult due to "the amorphous nature of customary lawmaking,"39 it seems
clear that some of the norms articulated in the UNDRIP crystallized into
customary international law prior to the United States' first objection in 2007.
According to Professor Wiessner, writing in 1999, "the requisite opiniojuris
expected from our Governments a decisive recognition of their collective rights").
34. See id. at 3 (statement of Namibia) (stating that "[t]he argument that the Declaration
is not binding did not appeal to us").
35. INT'L LAW Ass'N, CONSTITUTION OF THE AsSOCIATION art. 3.1 (2010), available at
http://www.ila-hq.org/en/about-us/index.cfn (follow "ILA Constitution (English)" hyperlink).
36. See ILA REPORT, supra note 16, at 6.
37. Jonathan I. Charney, UniversalInternationalLaw, 87 AM. J. INT'L. L. 529,538 (1993).
There is some uncertainty surrounding the rule. Some scholars question whether the rule
remains valid because it is "rarely invoked." Id. Others regard the rule as "logically
incoherent." Patrick Dumberry, Incoherent and Ineffective: The Concept of the Persistent
Objector Doctrine Revisited, 59 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 779, 780 (2010). The United States and
other legal commentators regard the rule as part of international law. See Curtis A. Bradley,
The Juvenile Death Penalty and International Law, 52 DuKE L.J. 485, 516-17 (2002) (citing to
the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, major treatises on international law, and the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law).
38. Dumberry, supra note 37, at 780.
39. Charney, supra note 37, at 538.
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[exists] for the identification of. . . the right to political, economic and social
self-determination" of indigenous peoples.40 Additionally, after surveying the
practice of States and decisions primarily from the Inter-American human
rights system, professors Anaya and Williams concluded in 2001 that States
were obligated to consult with indigenous peoples on matters that may affect
them and to identify and secure indigenous peoples' communal lands.4 1 At
least with regards to these rights and obligations, the United States' objection
is not timely.
Moreover, the United States' long history and practice of recognizing
indigenous peoples' rights is difficult to reconcile with its objection to the
customary nature of the UNDRIP. As highlighted below, the United States has
maintained a policy of self-determination for Native American tribes since
1970,42 and has called governmental departments and agencies to consult with
Native Americans since at least 1994.43 In fact, as Anaya and Wiessner noted
in 2007, just after the adoption of the UNDRIP, "[t]he internal practice of the
four opposing [S]tates, as well as their consent to accord a special status and
rights to indigenous peoples in principle, makes them part of the world
consensus on customary international aw." Given the United States' record
and its relatively recent objection to the customary character of indigenous
peoples' rights found in the UNDRIP, relying on the persistent objector rule
to immunize itself from international legal obligations fails.
40. Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status ofIndigenous Peoples: A Global Comparative
andInternationalLegalAnalysis, 12 HARv. HUM RTs. J. 57, 127 (1999). This echoes Anaya's
1996 treatise. S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 112-13 (2d ed.
2004).
41. S. James Anaya & Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Protection of Indigenous Peoples'
Rights over Lands and Natural Resources Under the Inter-American Human Rights System, 14
HARV. HuM. RTS. J. 33, 76-79 (2001).
42. 116 CONG. REC. 23,132 (1970) (message of President Nixon to Congress).
43. Memorandum on Government-to-Government Relations with Native American Tribal
Governments, 30 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 936 (Apr. 28, 1994) (memorandum from
President Clinton for the heads of executive departments and agencies).
44. Anaya & Wiessner, supra note 30 (emphasis added). Anaya and Wiessner also add that
[alt most, [Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States] can be
considered persistent objectors to certain contents of the Declaration. This status
appears to be very much in doubt, however, at least for Canada, as it counted itself
through many years amongst the staunchest supporters of the Declaration and
indigenous peoples' rights - until its government changed in February 2006.
Id. They do not define "certain contents of the Declaration," but given the United States'
practice with regards to self-determination, consultation, and the timing of the objection, it
seems unlikely that they are referring to those provisions.
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Each of the UNDRIP's rights and duties are relevant to the Maine tribes.
As highlighted in the Joint Resolution, the UNDRIP ensures that indigenous
peoples' rights to cultural integrity, education, health, and political
participation are protected.45 The UNDRIP also provides for the recognition
of indigenous peoples' rights to their lands and natural resources, and the
observation of their treaty rights,46 all of which are also extremely important
to the four Maine tribes. It is the UNDRIP's right to self-determination and
the duty of States to consult with indigenous peoples and to gain their consent,
however, that warrant immediate attention in Maine.
III. The Right to Self-Determination
The inclusion of the right to self-determination in the UNDRIP was
controversial, prolonging its final adoption by the General Assembly and cited
as the reason for several States' rejection or abstention."7 The primary concern
over its application to indigenous peoples was the ability to maintain the
integrity of States' territorial boundaries.4 8  Because the right to self-
determination was asserted by States under colonial control to gain their
independence,49 States did not want to face the prospect of indigenous peoples
45. Joint Resolution, supra note 1.
46. UNDRIP, supra note 6, art. 26.
47. See U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 108th plen. mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. A/61/PV.108 (Sept. 13,
2007) (statement of Nigeria) (expressing concern over articles 3 and 4 addressing self-
determination); see also U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 107th plen. mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc A/61/PV.107
(Sept. 13, 2007) ("The Australian Government has long expressed its dissatisfaction with the
references to self-determination in the declaration. Self-determination applies to situations of
decolonization and the break-up of States into smaller States with clearly defined population
groups. It also applies where a particular group within a defined territory is disenfranchised and
is denied political or civil rights. It is not a right that attaches to an undefined subgroup of a
population seeking to obtain political independence."); Press Release, Robert Hagen,
Explanation of Vote by Robert Hagen, U.S. Advisor, on the Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, to the U.N. General Assembly, United States Mission to the U.N. (Sept.
13, 2007) [hereinafter U.S. 2007 Statement] (arguing that "the declaration should have used
clear and understandable language" to articulate a right of self-determination, which is different
from the right to self-determination found in Article 1 of both the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights). The United States offered a new interpretation of the right to self-determination in its
statement reversing its position. It now regards the UNDRIP's right to self-determination as
"a new and distinct international concept of self-determination specific to indigenous peoples,
... different from the existing right of self-determination in international law." U.S. 2010
Statement, supra note 9, at 3.
48. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
49. See generally Dr. Saby Ghoshray, Revisiting the Challenging Landscape of Self-
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asserting the right to self-determination in an effort to create a separate State.
The concern was alleviated with the inclusion of article 46, which provides in
part that "[n]othing in this Declaration may be .. . construed as authorizing or
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part,
the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent
States."so
Almost without exception, indigenous peoples have not asserted this aspect
of the right to self-determination." Instead, indigenous communities rely on
the right in an effort "to be full and equal participants in the creation of the
institutions of government under which they live and, further, to live within a
governing institutional order in which they are perpetually in control of their
own destinies."52 As aptly noted by former Working Group on Indigenous
Peoples Chairperson, Dr. Erica-Irene A. Daes, the right to self-determination
for indigenous peoples is about feeling that "they have choices about their way
of life" and are able to "live well and humanly in their own ways."" It is this
Determination Within the Context ofNation's Right to Sovereignty, 11 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 443, 448-50 (2005).
50. UNDRIP, supra note 6, art. 46(1), at 9; see also U.S. 2010 Statement, supra note 9, at
3 (explaining that the United States views the UNDRIP's right to self-determination as "a new
and distinct international concept of self-determination specific to indigenous peoples,...
different from the existing right of self-determination in international law").
51. See Siegfried Wiessner, Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light of the UN
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1141, 1160
(2008) (noting that indigenous peoples have not sought to create separate and new States);
ANAYA, supra note 40, at 60 ("[I]ndigenous peoples generally have invoked 'a right of self-
determination' as an expression of their desire to continue as distinct communities free from
oppression, while in virtually all instances denying aspirations to independent statehood.").
This aspect of self-determination is sometimes referred to as "external self-determination." See
Wiessner, supra, at 1165-66. Professor Anaya, on the other hand, describes the right to self-
determination as consisting of both "constitutive" and "ongoing" aspects. See ANAYA, supra
note 40, at 104-05. But see ILA REPORT, supra note 16, at 11 (arguing that the interpretation
of the right to self-determination in this manner should be seen as an "added prerogative to the
ones usually recognized by international law . . .. [and] therefore does not preclude indigenous
peoples from being beneficiaries of the general right to self-determination as granted to all
peoples by general international law and common Article 1 of the U.N. human rights covenants
of 1966, to be operationalized through the provisions of UNDRIP").
52. ANAYA, supra note 40, at 113.
53. See Dr. Erica-Irene A. Daes, The Concepts of Self-Determination and Autonomy of
Indigenous Peoples in the Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, 14 ST. THoMAs L. REv. 259, 264 (2001) (Susan J. Ferrell keynote address).
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understanding of the right as it is applied to indigenous peoples that is
recognized under customary international law.54
Articles 3 and 4 of the UNDRIP explicitly address the right to self-
determination. Article 3 provides that "[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to
self-determination [and] [b]y virtue of that right they freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development."" In article 4, the UNDRIP adds that, "in exercising their right
to self-determination, [indigenous peoples] have the right to autonomy or self-
government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as
ways and means for financing their autonomous functions." 6
Of particular relevance to the Maine tribes is article 4's provision for
autonomy or self-government over internal affairs. As clarified by the
International Law Association, the terms autonomy and self-government share
the same meaning: autonomy means the right or condition of self-
government." Within the context of indigenous peoples and under
international law, these terms "consist[] of the devolution of a range of
powers"" from the State to an indigenous community, whereby indigenous
peoples can "control the development of their distinctive cultures, including
their use of land and resources," through their own governance structures. 59
Although an earlier draft of the UNDRIP listed examples of areas over
which indigenous peoples may exercise the right to self-govern, the adopted
54. See ANAYA, supra note 40, at 127 n.101 (citing generally to Comm'n on Human
Rights, Sub-Comm'n on Prevention ofDiscrimination ofDiscrimination and Prot. ofMinorities,
Rep. of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on Its Eleventh Session, 22-23, U.N.
Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29 (Aug. 23, 1993)); Wiessner, supra note 40, at 127 (finding that
widespread State practice and opinio juris recognizes indigenous peoples' rights to "maintain
and develop their distinct cultural identity, their spirituality, their language, and their traditional
ways of life . .. [and] the right to political, economic and social self-determination, including
a wide range of autonomy and the maintenance and strengthening of their own system of
justice"); Federico Lenzerini, Sovereignty Revisited: International Law and Parallel
Sovereignty oflndigenous Peoples, 42 TEX. INT'L L.J. 155, 186 (2006); ILA Report, supra note
16, at 51 ("These rules of customary law correspond to the following provisions: indigenous
peoples have the right to self-determination, that secures to indigenous peoples have the right
to decide, within the territory of the State in which they live, what their future will be.").
55. UNDRIP, supra note 6, art. 3.
56. Id. art. 4 (emphasis added).
57. ILA REPORT, supra note 16, at 13.
58. Stefania Errico, The Draft UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: An
Overview, 7 Hum. RTs. L. REv. 741, 750 (2007) (focusing on the term autonomy).
59. ANAYA, supra note 40, at 152; see also Lenzerini, supra note 54, at 186 ("[T]he recent
evolution of international law concerning indigenous peoples demonstrates that a principle has
emerged requiring States to recognize a given degree ofsovereignty in favor of such peoples.").
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text does not. As explained by Stefania Errico, however, other provisions of
the UNDRIP "shed light on the content" of the right to autonomy/self-
government and the right to self-determination generally.60 Each of the
UNDRIP's collective rights articulates an aspect of the right to self-
determination. The UNDRIP uses language such as "control," "maintain,"
"develop," and "determine" when describing indigenous peoples' rights over
their cultural, spiritual, educational, political, economic and social institutions,
health and housing programs, and over the development and use of their lands
and natural resources.
The United States already recognizes the right to self-determination. It
noted in its explanation of its 2007 General Assembly vote - ironically against
the UNDRIP - that "[u]nder United States domestic law, the United States
government recognizes Indian tribes as political entities with inherent powers
of self-government as first peoples."6 The United States added that this
principle of tribal sovereignty
means promoting tribal self-government over a broad range of
internal and local affairs, including determination of membership,
culture, language, religion, education, information, social welfare,
maintenance of community safety, family relations, [e]conomic
activities, lands and resources management, environment and entry
by non-members, as well as ways and means for financing these
autonomous functions.
This statement, which the U.S. government reiterated in its 2010 statement
reversing its position on the UNDRIP,63 stems from two centuries of United
60. Errico, supra note 58, at 750.
61. U.S. 2007 Statement, supra note 47. In fact, many of the rights contained in the
UNDRIP are already recognized under federal Indian law or are part of federal policy, such as
treaty rights and the protection of indigenous cultural and religious practices.
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. U.S. 2010 Statement, supra note 9, at 3 ("For the United States, the Declaration's
concept of self-determination is consistent with the United States' existing recognition of, and
relationship with, federally recognized tribes as political entities that have inherent sovereign
powers of self-governance. This recognition is the basis for the special legal and political
relationship, including the government-to-government relationship, established between the
United States and federally recognized tribes, pursuant to which the United States supports,
protects, and promotes tribal governmental authority over a broad range of internal and
territorial affairs, including membership, culture, language, religion, education, information,
social welfare, community and public safety, family relations, economic activities, lands and
resource management, environment and entry by non-members, as well as ways and means for
financing these autonomous governmental functions.") (emphasis added).
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States jurisprudence on tribal sovereignty and self-government. In Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia' and Worcester v. Georgia," two of the earliest cases
addressing Indian tribes, the Supreme Court declared tribes to be distinct,
independent political communities "capable of managing [their] own affairs
and governing [themselves]." More recently, the Court recognized that tribes
retain "rights in matters of local self-government."'
Although the principle of tribal sovereignty remains part of federal law, the
courts have steadily weakened its scope." This is particularly evident in
Maine where tribes do not fully enjoy their right to self-determination and the
federal Indian law principle of tribal sovereignty. As mentioned above, Indian
tribes in Maine do not retain the same authority over their lands and people
because of the legislation enacted by Congress and Maine settling the tribes'
land claims in 1980 and 1991. The courts, which have addressed the sovereign
powers of the Maine tribes, essentially adopted the arguments of the State of
Maine. 9 The courts and Maine favored language found in the settlement acts
providing for the application of state law to the tribes over other language
recognizing these tribes as sovereign governments, arguably in contravention
of federal Indian law principles and canons."o
64. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1(1831).
65. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
66. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 12.
67. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55 (1978) (citing Worcester, 31 U.S. (6.
Pet.) at 559) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193,
204 (2004) (affirming "our traditional understanding ofthe tribes' status as 'domestic dependent
nations"'); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408,
425 (1989) ("Thus, an Indian tribe generally retains sovereignty by way of tribal self-
government and control over other aspects of its internal affairs.").
68. One of federal Indian law's foundational doctrines is the doctrine of discovery. First
cited and relied upon in Johnson v. MIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), the doctrine
provides that the discovery of the New World by the European powers gave those nations "an
exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest."
Id. at 587. Some international human rights bodies have criticized the United States' continued
reliance on the doctrine of discovery. See e.g. Special Rapporteur, Preliminary Study of the
Impact on Indigenous Peoples of the International Legal Construct Known as the Doctrine of
Discovery, U.N. Doc. No. E/C. 19/2010/13 (Feb. 4, 2010); Commission on Human Rights,
Indigenous Peoples and Their Relationship to the Land, Erica-Irene A. Daes, 31, 89, U.N.
Doc. No. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/21 (June 11, 2001).
69. See generally Aroostook Band of Micmacs v. Ryan, 484 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 2007);
Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians v. Ryan, 484 F.3d 73 (1st Cir. 2007).
70. Despite being the focus of much litigation, the treatment by the courts of these
settlement acts and the negotiations surrounding their enactments have received little, but much
needed, academic attention and analysis.
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The two cases that exemplify the continued infringement on the right to
self-determination, especially with regards to the Micmac and Maliseet tribes,
are Aroostook Band ofMicmacs v. Ryan and Houlton Band ofMaliseet Indians
v. Ryan (hereinafter collectively referred to as the Ryan cases)." Before
reviewing that infringement, however, any analysis or discussion of the tribes'
rights is impossible without a brief examination of the federal and state
settlement acts. The Penobscot and Passamaquoddy tribes received almost the
exact same treatment under the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act
(MICSA)72 - the federal settlement act, and the Maine Implementing Act
(MIA)" - the state settlement act. The Maliseets and Micmacs received
different treatment from that of the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy tribes, but
received similar treatment to each other under the above-mentioned acts, as
well as separate federal and state settlement acts.74
The late 1970s negotiations between the Penobscot Indian Nation, the
Passamaquoddy Tribe, and Maine resulted in what is commonly referred to as
the Maine Implementing Act.7 ' The MIA addresses a variety of issues,
including jurisdiction, defining which lands will be acquired for the benefit
of the tribes,77 sovereign immunity," regulation of fish and wildlife, 79
taxation,o and the creation of a Maine Indian tribal-state commission." Of
significance, the MIA includes a specific provision for the Passamaquoddy and
71. Because of the similarity of the issues in these two cases, the appeals court heard the
cases jointly and decided these cases on the same day. The court applied the same analysis and
reasoning to both cases.
72. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1721-1735 (2006).
73. Act to Implement the Maine Indian Claims Settlement, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30,
§§ 6201-6214 (2009).
74. See COMM. ON INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS, EMPOWERING INDIAN TRIBES TO
EXERCISE MISDEMEANOR CRIMINAL JURISDICTIONS OVER INDIANS, H.R. REP. No. 102-229, at
1 (1991); Aroostook Band of Micmacs Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-171, 105 Stat. 1143
(1991); Micmac Settlement Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, §§ 7201-7207 (2009).
75. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, §§ 6201-6214 (2009).
76. Id. § 6204 (asserting that state law applies to Indian lands); see also id. § 6206(1)
(outlining the jurisdiction of Penobscot and Passamaquoddy tribes); id. § 6206-A (delineating
the authority of the Maliseets); id. § 6209-A (outlining the jurisdiction of the Passamaquoddy
Tribal Court); id. § 6209-B (outlining the jurisdiction of the Penobscot Nation Tribal Court);
id. § 6210 (prescribing rules for law enforcement).
77. See id. §§ 6205, 6205-A.
78. Id. § 6206(2) (noting that Passamaquoddy and Penobscot tribes may be sued in state
courts).
79. Id. § 6207.
80. Id. §§ 6208, 6208-A.
81. Id. § 6212.
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Penobscot tribes, treating them similarly to municipalities but recognizing their
authority and jurisdiction over "internal tribal matters."82 In accordance with
federal law, the Maine legislature subsequently submitted the MIA to
Congress for approval. Congress's approval took its form in MICSA, signed
by President Carter in October 1980." MICSA extinguished aboriginal Indian
title for all Indian tribes in Maine." In return, Congress recognized the
Penobscot Indian Nation and the Passamaquoddy Tribe, and compensated
them in settlement of their land claims.
The Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians, unlike the Penobscot and
Passamaquoddy, "had not been previously recognized as a discrete Indian tribe
by. . . the State of Maine," but had a "potential claim"" and was included in
the 1980 settlement.8 ' At the state level, the Maliseets were eventually
included in the MIA despite that the State of Maine initially did not regard
them as a tribe and therefore unworthy of federal recognition and benefits."
They did not participate in the negotiations between Maine and the Penobscot
and Passamaquoddy tribes, but were later included in both the MIA and
MICSA, receiving federal recognition and a small portion of the financial
settlement." The MIA did not include the Maliseets in the "internal tribal
matters" and municipality provisions applicable to the Penobscot and
Passamaquoddy, but instead provided that the Maliseets "shall not exercise nor
82. Id. § 6206(1). The term "internal tribal matters" is not fully defined in the MIA except
that section 6206(1) states that it "includ[es] membership in the respective tribe or nation, the
right to reside within the respective Indian territories, tribal organization, tribal government,
tribal elections and the use or disposition of settlement fund income shall not be subject to
regulation by the State." Id. The First Circuit developed a unique test to determine whether
something is an "internal tribal matter." See Akins v. Penobscot Nation, 130 F.3d 482, 486-88
(1st Cir. 1997).
83. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1721-1735 (2006).
84. See id. § 1723(c).
85. See id. § 1724.
86. DANIEL K. INOUYE, SELECT COMM. ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, SETTLING ALL CLAIMS OF THE
AROOSTOOK BAND OF MIcMAcs RESULTING FROM THE BAND'S OMISSION FROM THE MAINE
INDIAN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT ACT OF 1980, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, S. REP. No. 102-136,
at 2 (1991).
87. See 25 U.S.C. § 172 1(a)(1)-(2).
88. See Proposed Settlement of Maine Indian Land Claims: Hearings on S. 2829 Before
the Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 96th Cong. 37, 163 (1980) (statement of Richard Cohen,
Att'y Gen. of Maine) (stating that Maine viewed the "claim of the so-called Maliseet Band of
Indians" as being "not meritorious" because "[t]he Maliseet do not now exist as a tribe of
Indians, nor have they existed as a tribe for many years") (emphasis added).
89. See Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians Supplementary Claims Settlement Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-566, 100 Stat. 3184 (1986).
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enjoy the powers, privileges and immunities of a municipality nor exercise
civil or criminal jurisdiction within their lands prior to the enactment of
additional legislation specifically authorizing the exercise of those
governmental powers."o
Congress, on the other hand, federally recognized the Maliseets through "a
formal political act confirming the tribe's existence as a distinct political
society, and institutionalizing the government-to-government relationship
between the tribe and the federal government."" MICSA also recognized the
Maliseets' right to "organize for its common welfare and adopt an appropriate
instrument in writing to govern the affairs of the ... band when each is acting
in its governmental capacity,"92 though it simultaneously provided that the
appropriate instrument "must be consistent with the terms of this [act] and the
[MIA]."93 Moreover, under MICSA, Maine and the Maliseets were
"authorized to execute agreements regarding the jurisdiction of the State of
Maine over lands owned by or held in trust for the benefit of the band or its
members." 94 But MICSA nonetheless made state laws applicable to "all
Indians, Indian nations, or tribes or bands of Indians in the State of Maine,
other than the Passamaquoddy Tribe, the Penobscot Nation, and their
members."95
The Aroostook Band of Micmacs was not part of the 1980 settlement. By
1986, however, the Band managed to compile documentation to prove it was
a tribe and pursued relief through MICSA. In response, Maine enacted the
Micmac Settlement Act (MSA)." In 1991, Congress acted to redress the
inequity caused by MICSA by passing the Aroostook Band of Micmacs
Settlement Act (ABMSA), which provided the Band with federal recognition
and compensation for the extinguishment of its aboriginal title to lands in
90. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 6206-A (2009).
91. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 138 (Nell Jessup Newton et. al. eds.,
LexisNexis 2005); see also 25 C.F.R. § 83.2 (2011) (explaining that federal recognition
"mean[s] that the tribe is entitled to the immunities and privileges available to other federally
acknowledged Indian tribes by virtue of their government-to-government relationship with the
United States as well as the responsibilities, powers, limitations and obligations of such tribes").
92. 25 U.S.C. § 1726(a). In the Ryan cases, the Micmacs and Maliseets highlighted that this
is the same language found in the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA), Pub. L. No. 73-
383, 48 Stat. 987 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 476(a) (2006)) (a federal law which sought to
place greater control in the hands of Indian tribes as opposed to government agents).
93. 25 U.S.C. § 1726(a).
94. Id. § 1725(e)(2).
95. Id. § 1725(a).
96. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, §§ 7201-7207 (2009).
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Maine.97 The MSA mirrored the language of the MIA addressing the
Maliseets' treatment under the MIA with regards to jurisdiction and
sovereignty." ABMSA, on the other hand, federally recognized the Band,99
and provided that they "may organize for its common welfare and adopt an
appropriate instrument in writing to govern the affairs of the Band when acting
in its governmental capacity." 00
Returning to the Ryan cases, the lawsuits were brought by Maine's Human
Rights Commission and concerned the authority of the Maliseets and Micmacs
to manage employment relations with their government employees.' The two
tribes argued that although the settlement acts allow for the application of state
law, those same laws did not expressly abrogate the Micmacs and Maliseets'
own inherent sovereign authority over matters such as government-
employment relations.'o2 Specifically, the Micmacs and Maliseets argued that,
because the settlement acts address the rights of Indian tribes, they must be
interpreted using federal Indian law principles. 103 Because the two federal
settlement acts affirmed the sovereignty of the two tribes when providing for
their federal recognition and authority to organize as government, the Micmacs
and Maliseets argued that they should retain their authority to manage the
employment relationships within their own governments.'"
Maine simply argued that both tribal governments were subject to Maine's
employment discrimination laws by virtue of the express language of the
settlement acts providing for the application of state laws. The Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit agreed with Maine and specifically noted that "the
question in this case is resolved by these two federal statutes - both of which
are settlement acts - and not by Indian common law."0 '
97. Aroostook Band of Micmacs Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-171, 105 Stat. 1143
(1991).
98. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 7205 ("Micmacs shall not exercise nor enjoy the powers,
privileges and immunities of a municipality nor exercise civil or criminal jurisdiction within
their lands prior to the enactment of additional legislation specifically authorizing the exercise
of those governmental powers.").
99. Aroostook Band of Micmacs Settlement Act, § 6(a), 105 Stat. at 1148.
100. Id. § 7(a), 105 Stat. at 1148.
101. Aroostook Band of Micmacs v. Ryan, 484 F.3d 41,43 (1st Cir. 2007); Houlton Band
of Maliseet Indians v. Ryan, 484 F.3d 73, 74 (1st Cir. 2007).
102. Aroostook Band, 484 F.3d at 49-50.
103. Id at 64.
104. The two tribes also argued that their tribal sovereign immunity prevented the state
enforcement of those laws against the tribal government. See id.; Houlton Band, 484 F.3d at
74.
105. Aroostook Band, 484 F.3d at 44 (emphasis added).
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On the surface, the Ryan cases may seem relatively harmless: the two tribes
are subject to Maine's employment laws. Practically, however, the Ryan cases
leave these two tribes with essentially no sovereign authority over their lands
and peoples. They are subject to Maine law with only a few exceptions.' As
characterized by the First Circuit, the federal recognition of the Micmacs and
Maliseets was "merely an acknowledgment that [they] are eligible for
particular federal tax treatment and benefits,"'0o as opposed to the recognition
of their sovereign authority, or - to draw on the terminology of international
human rights law - their right to self-government. Not only does this make the
Maliseets and Micmacs atypical among federally recognized tribes, but it also
infringes upon their right to self-determination.
Returning to the plain language of the UNDRIP, the Micmacs and Maliseets
do not enjoy their "right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating
to their internal and local affairs."' Although the two tribes are able to elect
tribal leaders, those leaders have little authority to make decisions based on
their laws or customs because they are subject almost completely to the laws
of Maine. Government-employee relations is an internal affair,' as is
managing the use of natural resources and determining economic development
activities. Without greater autonomy to "control the lands, territories and
resources that they possess"'" and "maintain and develop their own
indigenous decision-making institutions,""' the Micmacs and Maliseets are
unable to "control. . . their own destinies,"ll2 and are therefore unable to fully
enjoy their right to self-determination. Even under the federal principle of
tribal sovereignty, the treatment of the Micmacs and Maliseets falls
remarkably short.
106. Id. at 49 n.6 ("The State's acknowledgment is only that ABMSA § 7(a) may give the
Aroostook Band independence over aspects of its own governmental and electoral structures.");
see also Houlton Band ofMaliseet Indians v. Boyce, 688 A.2d 908, 910 (Me. 1997) (upholding
an injunction against tribal members from interfering in tribal business but not examining the
legitimacy of a tribal election). More recently, Maine and the Maliseets agreed to recognize the
jurisdiction of a tribal court to hear minor criminal offenses committed by tribal members and
civil lawsuits between tribal members. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 6209-C (2009). The
Penobscot and Passamaquoddy tribes have greater authority under the settlement acts.
107. Aroostook Band, 484 F.3d at 57.
108. UNDRIP, supra note 6, art. 4 (emphasis added).
109. The First Circuit acknowledged this in Penobscot Nation v. Fellencer, 164 F.3d 706,
712 (1999), relying on the "internal tribal matters" language found in the MIA.
110. UNDRIP, supra note 6, art. 26(2).
111. Id. art. 18.
112. ANAYA, supra note 40, at 113.
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The Penobscot and Passamaquoddy tribes also retain limited self-
government, despite receiving better treatment under the settlement acts.
These two tribes benefit from language found in the state settlement act
recognizing their authority over "internal tribal matters."' 13 But relative to the
UNDRIP's "right to self-government in internal and local matters," the courts
and the State of Maine interpret "internal tribal matters" more narrowly. For
example, in the Johnson case discussed below, the First Circuit held that
"internal tribal matters" does not include the authority of the two tribes to
regulate pollutant discharges into their waters within their own territory."4
This narrow reading, however, ignores the importance that water and other
natural resources play in these two tribes' culture, as well as the subsistence
it provides to their members.
As acknowledged by the United States in its statement, the scope of self-
determination includes "authority over ... lands and resources management
[and] environment.""'5 The UNDRIP supports this interpretation in article
26(2), which provides that "[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to own, use,
develop and control the lands, territories and resources that they possess.""'
The UNDRIP expressly recognizes the importance of land control to self-
determination. It notes that "control by indigenous peoples over developments
affecting them and their lands, territories and resources will enable them to
maintain and strengthen their institutions, cultures and traditions, and to
promote their development in accordance with their aspirations and needs."''
The work of the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic
Development also shows the importance of the right to self-determination for
indigenous peoples. Its decades of research found that the greater the
autonomy that an Indian tribe retains over its decision-making, the greater the
opportunity it has for the economic development of its tribe and its
members."' The Micmacs and Maliseets live in the poorest regions of Maine,
113. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 6206(1) (2009).
114. Maine v. Johnson, 498 F.3d 37, 45 (1st Cir. 2007).
115. U.S. 2010 Statement, supra note 9, at 3.
116. UNDRIP, supra note 6, art. 26(2); see also id. art. 25 ("Indigenous peoples have the
right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditionally
owned or otherwise occupied and used lands, territories, waters and coastal seas and other
resources and to uphold their responsibilities to future generations in this regard."); id. art. 32(1)
("Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for the
development or use of their lands or territories and other resources.").
17. Id. pmbl.
118. See Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Sovereignty and Nation-Building: The
Development Challenge in Indian Country Today, 22 AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RES. J. 187,209
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and their members, along with other Native Americans living in Maine, earn
less than the general population, with more of them living below the poverty
level." 9 Tribal members living in Maine would benefit if their governments
enjoyed more robust self-government powers. Moreover, in addition to being
out of step with federal Indian law, the decisions and the interpretation of the
settlement acts by Maine and the courts highlight why change is needed to
ensure that the Micmac, Maliseet, Penobscot, and Passamaquoddy tribes' right
to self-determination is respected.
IV. A State's Duty to Consult and Free, Prior, and Informed Consent
Related to the right to self-determination is the right to participate in the
larger political governing structure. As indigenous peoples have a right "to
maintain and develop their own indigenous decision-making institutions,"'20
they also "have the right to participate in decision-making in matters which
would affect their rights, through representatives chosen by themselves in
accordance with their own procedure[s]."l2 ' By fostering the active
participation of indigenous peoples, the expectation is that their rights will be
protected and their cultural and physical survival ensured. Maine's Indian
tribes enjoy and exercise their right to participation in public affairs. The
Penobscot, Passamaquoddy, and Maliseet tribes may send representatives to
Maine's House of Representatives,122 participate in the Maine Indian Tribal-
(1998) (reprinted in 2003 by the Native Nations Institute and the Harvard Project on American
Indian Economic Development as No. 2003-03 in the "Joint Occasional Papers on Native
Affairs" series) ("To date, however, only one federal policy orientation has been associated with
sustained economic development on at least those Indian reservations that have exercised de
facto sovereignty through their own institutions: the self-determination policy that emerged in
the 1970s. In other words, not only does tribal sovereignty work, but the evidence indicates that
a federal policy of supporting the freedom of Indian nations to govern their own affairs, control
their own resources, and determine their own futures is the only policy orientation that works.
Everything else has failed."); see also HARVARD PROJECT ON AM. INDIAN EcoN. DEV., THE
STATE OF THE NATIVE NATIoNs 10 (2008).
119. Stephen Brimley, Native American Sovereignty in Maine, ME. POL'Y REv., Fall/Winter
2004, at 12, 20, available at http://www.mitsc.org/documents/42_nativeamericansovereignty.
pdf.
120. UNDRIP, supra note 6, art. 18.
121. Id.; see also id. art. 5 ("Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen
their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining their
right to participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life of
the State.").
122. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 1 (2009).
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State Commission, 12 3 and have assisted with the drafting of legislation that
affects them.'24
A corollary to the right to participation is the UNDRIP's requirement that
States consult with their indigenous peoples. Article 19 provides that "States
shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples
concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their
free, prior and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative
or administrative measures that may affect them."l2 5 The duty to consult is "a
generally accepted principle in international law."' As with the right to self-
determination, the United States government recognizes this duty by requiring
federal departments and agencies to consult with Indian tribes.127 Recently, the
ILA included among the rules of customary law the right of indigenous
peoples "to be consulted with respect to any project that may affect them." 28
The normative content of the duty to consult requires that consultations be
made "in good faith,"'29 meaning that the mere holding of a meeting with an
indigenous community does not meet the requirement of consultation. Instead,
the goal of any consultation must be to obtain the free, prior, and informed
consent of an indigenous community before any action is taken.130
123. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 6212 (2009).
124. See e.g., Act To Amend the 1980 Maine Implementing Act To Authorize the
Establishment of a Tribal Court for the Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians and Related Matters,
ch. 384, sec. F-1, F-3, F-4, 2009 Me. Laws 1159-60 (codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30,
§ 6212). The Aroostook Band of Micmacs unfortunately have not been afforded the same
treatment as the other three tribes. See id.
125. UNDRIP, supra note 6, art. 19.
126. See generally James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples' Participatory Rights in Relation to
Decisions About Natural Resource Extraction: The More Fundamental Issue of What Rights
Indigenous Peoples Have in Lands and Resources, 22 ARiZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 7 (2005)
(citing ILO No. 169, cases of the U.N. Human Rights Committee, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, and the then-draft U.N. Declaration as international legal precedent).
127. See e.g., Consultation and Coordination With Indian Tribal Governments, Exec. Order
No. 13175, 3 C.F.R. 304 (2000); Memorandum on Tribal Consultation, 2009 DAILY COMP.
PREs. Doc. 887 (Nov. 5, 2009) (calling for "meaningful consultation and collaboration with
tribal officials"). In its statement reversing its position on the UNDRIP, the United States
recognized "the significance of the Declaration's provisions on free, prior and informed
consent." U.S. 2010 Statement, supra note 9, at 5.
128. ILA Report, supra note 16, at 51.
129. UNDRIP, supra note 6, art. 19; see also ILO 169, supra note 25, art. 6(2); Saramaka
People v. Suriname, Interpretation of the Judgment of Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 185, 17 (Aug. 12, 2008).
130. See, e.g., ILO 169, supra note 25, art. 6(2) ("The consultations carried out in
application of this Convention shall be undertaken, in good faith and in a form appropriate to
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Additionally, "[t]he duty to consult is not limited to circumstances in which a
proposed measure will or may affect an already recognized right or legal
entitlement.""' This means that consultations are required even when the
proposed decision or activity will impact the interests of indigenous peoples,
such as their ability to practice and enjoy their cultural and spiritual customs.
Whether consent is required is disputed, and its inclusion in the UNDRIP
concerned some States.'32 The dispute and concern centers on whether article
19 grants a veto power to indigenous peoples over projects that may impact
them. The ILA acknowledged the dispute in its 2010 report on the UNDRIP,
and concluded that given "the recognition of collective rights of indigenous
peoples, . . . the existence of the right of veto in favour of indigenous peoples
seems to be confirmed by the object and purpose of UNDRIP, as shown by
other provisions included in its text, as well as by pertinent international
practice."' The Inter-American Court, on the other hand, has held that States
may take action without the consent of an indigenous community, but only
when certain conditions are met. These conditions include benefit-sharing and
conducting an environmental and social-impact assessment. Moreover, States
rarely may take action without consent when the action would impact
indigenous peoples' lands and natural resources in a manner that threatens
their survival.134 Similarly, Professor Anaya has explained that the level of
consultation and consent "is a function of the nature of the substantive rights
the circumstances, with the objective of achieving agreement or consent to the proposed
measures."); UNDRIP, supra note 6, art. 19; Saramaka People v. Suriname, Interpretation of
the Judgment of Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 185, 17 (Aug. 12, 2008) ("Accordingly, the State has a duty, from the
onset of the proposed activity, to actively consult with the Saramaka people in good faith and
with the objective of reaching an agreement, which in turn requires the State to both accept and
disseminate information in an understandable and publicly accessible format.").
131. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation ofHuman
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ofIndigenous People, S. James Anaya, 144, Human Rights
Council, U.N. Doc. No. A/HRC/12/34 (July 15, 2009) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur 2009
Report].
132. See e.g., U.N. GAOR, 61st sess., 107th plen. mtg. at 24, U.N. Doc. A/61/PV. 107 (Sept.
13, 2007) (statement of Sweden) (stating that article 19 "does not entail a collective right to
veto"); id. at 18 (statement of Columbia) (stating that "[b]oth the Constitutional Court and the
ILO Committee of Experts have established that prior consultation does not imply a right to
veto State decisions, but that it is an ideal mechanism for enabling indigenous and tribal peoples
to exercise the right to express themselves and to influence the decision-making process").
133. ILA Report, supra note 16, at 14-15 (citation omitted).
134. See Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, IM 125-143 (Nov. 18, 2007) (discussing
restrictions on the right to property, including natural resources).
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at stake."' 3 ' For example, although consultations must be conducted with the
aim of obtaining consent, the relocation of indigenous peoples from their lands
requires consent, whereas a decision that would not involve an indigenous
community's rights to lands and natural resources typically would not require
consent.'36
The scope of this article does not include resolving this dispute, but it seems
clear that, at a minimum, certain projects and decisions require the consent of
indigenous peoples - especially those projects and decisions that will impact
their physical and cultural survival. Every consultation, however, must consist
of a "true dialogue" between the State and the indigenous community. 137
Examples exist of Maine respecting the tribes' right to participation and
fulfilling its duty to consult with Indian tribes. A recent executive order
signed by the Governor of Maine emphasizes the opportunities for
"collaborative partnership" and instructs state agencies to "[p]romote[]
effective two-way communication between the state agency and Maine's
Native American Tribes.""' A 2007 case, however, highlights Maine's
perspective that it is not required to consult with the tribes on matters that
would affect tribal natural resources and directly impact their ability to practice
their cultural customs.
The background to Maine v. Johnson is as follows. In 1999, Maine
submitted an application to the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to take over discharge permitting under the federal Clean Water
Act.' 9 After taking several years to evaluate Maine's jurisdiction in Indian
Country, the EPA issued its final decision in 2003, approving Maine's
135. See Anaya, supra note 126, at 7; see also Special Rapporteur 2009 Report, supra note
131, 46-49 ("Necessarily, the strength or importance of the objective of achieving consent
varies according to the circumstances and the indigenous interests involved.").
136. Anaya, supra note 126, at 17. The current position of the United States on this issue
falls on the side of no veto power. U.S. 2010 Statement, supra note 9, at 5 ("In this regard, the
United States recognizes the significance of the Declaration's provisions on free, prior and
informed consent, which the United States understands to call for a process of meaningful
consultation with tribal leaders, but not necessarily the agreement of those leaders, before the
actions addressed in those consultations are taken.").
137. Lee Swepston, The ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (No. 169): Eight
Years After Adoption, in THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 17, 23 (Cynthia Price
Cohen ed., 1998) (describing the requirements under article 6 of ILO No. 169).
138. An Order to Promote Effective Communication Between the State of Maine and the
Native American Tribes Located Within the State ofMaine, Exec. OrderNo. 06 FY 10/11 (Feb.
24, 2010).
139. Maine v. Johnson, 498 F.3d 37, 39-40 (1st Cir. 2007).
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program.'40 Specifically, the federal agency "concluded that Maine had
authority to regulate nineteen discharge facilities owned by non-Indians
located outside, but discharging to boundaries within, the territorial waters"l4 '
of the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy tribes.14 2 But the EPA also concluded
that Maine did not have authority over "two tribal-owned facilities located on
tribal lands and discharging into navigable waters within the southern tribes'
territories but which thereafter pass other downstream communities." 43 The
EPA retained its permitting authority over the two tribal facilities, citing the
settlement acts and concluding that regulation by the southern tribes over their
water resources was an "internal tribal matter" under the language of the
MIA.'"
With regards to the non-tribal discharge facilities, the EPA "expressed
concern that Maine's permitting program might not ensure water quality
standards adequate to protect the southern tribes' right to fish for individual
sustenance." 45 To deal with this concern, the EPA required "the state to
address the tribes' uses" and expected Maine to "consult[] with the southern
tribes, and [to] work[] collaboratively with them." 46
The State of Maine subsequently appealed the EPA's decision regarding the
two discharge facilities on tribal lands.147 The Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit affirmed the EPA's decision regarding the off-reservation discharge
points, but reversed as to the two source-points on tribal lands.14 8 The First
Circuit again looked only to the language of the settlement acts and held that
regulation of discharges into navigable waters is not an "internal tribal
matter." 49 As a result, Maine had the authority to regulate discharges into
140. Id. at 40 (citing State Program Requirements, 68 Fed. Reg. 65,052 (Nov. 18, 2003)
[hereinafter EPA Determination]).
141. Id. (citing EPA Determination, supra note 140, at 65,032). The term "southern tribes"
refers to the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy. Id. at 39. The EPA did not address Maine's
application toward the "northern tribes," the Maliseets and the Micmacs. EPA Determination,
supra note 140, at 65,054.
142. Johnson, 498 F.3d at 40 (citing EPA Determination, supra note 140, at 65,066).
143. Id. (citing EPA Determination, supra note 140, at 65,066).
144. Id. (citing EPA Determination, supra note 140, at 65,066).
145. Id. at 41 (citing EPA Determination, supra note 140, at 65,067).
146. EPA Determination, supra note 140, at 65,068.
147. Johnson, 498 F.3d at 41. The Penobscot and Passamaquoddy tribes intervened in
Maine's case against the EPA. The two tribes also filed their own suit against the EPA
regarding the non-tribal facilities discharging into tribal waters. The two cases were
consolidated. See id at 39.
148. Id. at 49.
149. Id. at 44-46 (relying on Akins v. Penobscot Nation, 130 F.3d 482, 488 (1st Cir. 1997)
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navigable waters on Penobscot and Passamaquoddy tribal lands.'" Noting that
the status of the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy tribes "markedly contrasts
with the status of Indian tribes in other states,""' the appeals court concluded
that the two tribes no longer retained their inherent authority over discharges
into navigable waters.'52
Citing ripeness, the First Circuit did not resolve the issue of whether the
EPA could review Maine's permitting program based on the trust doctrine,'53
a cornerstone of federal Indian law that places responsibilities on the
government to "insure the survival and welfare of Indian tribes and people."l5 4
According to the EPA, it sought to fulfill its trust responsibility as an arm of
the federal government by ensuring that Maine is protecting the tribes' usage
of the rivers. In particular, to protect how tribal members use the affected
waters, it sought to ensure preservation of their right to fish for sustenance by
maintaining "its authority to object to state-issued permits."' Maine
disagreed with the EPA, arguing that the EPA does not have "environmental
trust responsibilities to the tribes."'
The First Circuit's holding in Johnson is problematic when considering the
preservation of tribal sovereignty and when examining the settlement acts from
an international human rights perspective, especially in light of the right to
self-determination. As with the Ryan cases, Johnson highlights the limited
authority Maine tribes have over their lands and natural resources - a limited
authority that prevents them from fully exercising their right to self-
determination. But the case also highlights the necessity of consultation with
the tribes, especially when it comes to decisions that may negatively impact
their natural resources.
Maine argued against the existence of "environmental trust responsibilities
[owed] to the tribes"' and also denied the existence of the subsistence-fishing
rights of the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy tribes.' Instead, it argued that
and Penobscot Nation v. Fellencer, 164 F.3d 706, 710-11 (1st Cir. 1999)).
150. Id. at 45.
151. Id. at 42.
152. Id. at 45.
153. Id. at 47.
154. 1 AM. INDIAN POLICY REvIEw COMM'N, FINAL REPORT 130 (1977).
155. Johnson, 498 F.3d at 47..
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. The director of Maine's Department of Environmental Protection stated, "When we're
looking at the way the law and the standards are established, that's correct - there are no
sustenance fishing rights or standards that are created that connect back to the manner or extent
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a single water-quality standard exists for all, and, therefore, there is
presumably no need to consult with the tribes or to seek their consent prior to
implementing a permitting program under the Clean Water Act.159 This
perspective not only runs afoul of Maine's own support of the UNDRIP and
the recent executive order signed by the Governor of Maine, but also fails to
appreciate the primary reason why the duty to consult and free, prior, and
informed consent exist in the first place - to ensure the cultural and physical
survival of indigenous peoples.
The importance that indigenous peoples place on their lands and natural
resources is one of their defining characteristics. Among the several articles
providing for the protection of lands and natural resources, the UNDRIP
recognizes the "distinctive" relationship indigenous peoples have with their
"lands, territories, waters, [] coastal seas and other resources." 60 The Inter-
American Court eloquently states that
the close ties of indigenous people with the land must be
recognized and understood as the fundamental basis of their
cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity, and their economic
survival. For indigenous communities, [their relationship with] the
land is not merely a matter of possession and production but a
material and spiritual element, which they must fully enjoy [ . . . ]
to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it to future
generations."'
The importance of protecting the tribes' lands and natural resources is no
different. The Penobscot Nation is a tribe of over two thousand members,
most of whom live near or on Indian Island in the middle of the Penobscot
River in Maine.'62 The Penobscot River watershed has been and continues to
to which the tribes use the river. There is a standard for fishing for every-body." Gale Courey
Toensing, Maine Denies Tribe Has Sustenance Fishing Rights, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Sept.
10, 2007), available at http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2007/09/maine-denies-
tribe-has-sustenance-fishing-rights/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2011).
159. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
160. UNDRIP, supra note 6, art. 25.
161. Saramaka People v. Suriname, Interpretation of the Judgment on Preliminary
Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 185, 1
90 (Aug. 12, 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v.
Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 76,T 149
(Aug. 31, 2001)).
162. PENOBSCOTNATION, PENOBSCOTTRIBALBROCHuRE 4 (2010), available athttp://www.
penobscotculture.com/images/Penobscot-Tribal-Brochure-2010.pdf.
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be a hub of Penobscot tribal life, providing its members with sustenance.163
The tribe operates its own Department of Natural Resources, the mission of
which "is to manage, develop and protect the Penobscot Nation's natural
resources in a sustainable manner that protects and enhances the cultural
integrity of the Tribe."'" The Penobscot tribe is actively involved in water-
quality monitoring and shares its data of the Penobscot River with the state.'
Similarly, the two communities of the Passamaquoddy tribe are located
along and near the St. Croix River, which creates the border with Canada.'66
Both Passamaquoddy communities conduct environmental programs geared
toward protecting water resources, and have enacted tribal laws addressing
sustenance fishing and hunting by tribal members.'6 7 The EPA also recognized
the importance of water quality to the two southern tribes in its decision on
Maine's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
application.'
Regulating discharge facilities that pollute tribal waters clearly affects the
tribes, and gives rise not only to a duty to consult, but also to an obligation to
obtain the tribes' consent over regulations that are put into place. Pollutants
discharged into tribal waters impact how tribal members use those natural
resources. To ensure that those tribal resources are protected in a manner
deemed appropriate by the tribes themselves, the tribes must be involved in the
163. See id. at 6-7.
164. Department ofNaturalResources, PENOBSCOTINDIANNATION, http://www.penobscot
nation.org/DNR/DNRl.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2011) (emphasis added).
165. Through this relationship with the state, emergency water-quality problems have been
identified early. For example, as a result of the Penobscot's monitoring to quantify the
occurrence and severity of algae blooms in the river, the State of Maine better understands the
frequency and severity of the blooms, has improved its river model, and developed instream
criteria and discharge-permit levels for the algae-causing nutrients. U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, FINAL GUIDANCE ON AWARDS OF GRANTS TO INDIAN TRIBES UNDER SECTION 106 OF
THE CLEAN WATER ACT: FOR FISCAL YEARS 2007 AND BEYOND, at 5-23, 24, available at http://
www.epa.gov/owm/cwfinance/final-tribal-guidance.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2011); see also
PenobscotIndianNationFactSheet, U.S.EPA(Sept.2007),http://www.epa.gov/regionl/govt/
tribes/penobscotindiannation.html.
166. About thePassamaquoddy TribePASSAMAQUODDY.COM, http://www.passamaquoddy.
com/splashpage.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2011).
167. Passamaquoddy Indian Township, U.S. EPA (Nov. 15, 2010) http://www.epa.gov/
region 1/govt/tribes/passamaquoddyindiantownship.html; Passamaquoddy Tribe-PleasantPoint,
U.S. EPA (Nov. 15, 2010) http://www.epa.gov/regionl/govt/tribes/passamaquoddypleasant
point.html; see e.g., PASSAMAQUODDY TRIBAL ORDINANCES REGULATING HUNTING, FISHING
AND TRAPPING IN THE PASSAMAQUODDY INDIAN TERRITORY §§ 100(6), (12)-(13) (2007),
available at http://www.wabanaki.com/fish_&_game_law2.htm.
168. EPA Determination, supra note 140, at 65,056.
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decision-making process. Maine's refusal to consider the impact its water-
quality standards would have on tribal uses is a breach of its duties to consult
and to obtain the consent of the tribes. As noted above, the purpose of the
duty to consult is to ensure that indigenous peoples' rights are protected. Like
much of the UNDRIP, the duty to consult and to obtain free, prior, and
informed consent seeks to prevent disregard of indigenous peoples' rights to
their lands and natural resources, and indifference to the continuation of their
culture.
V The U.N. Declaration Provides Reasons Why the Settlement Acts Should
Be Revisited and Renegotiated
United States federal Indian law provides Congress with almost absolute
power to legislate over Indian affairs in a manner it sees fit."9 This doctrine
of congressional plenary power explains the centuries of Indian policy flip-
flopping from allotments and assimilation, to Indian reorganization, to
termination, and, finally, to self-determination. 7 0 The doctrine also explains,
in part, why the Maine tribes could be treated differently from other Indian
tribes through the passage of the settlement acts, which, as interpreted by the
courts and the State of Maine, severely limit the tribes' ability to self-govern.
Since the enactment of the first settlement acts thirty years ago, the State of
Maine and the tribes have regularly and aggressively litigated the acts'
meaning, resulting in strained relationships between them. Although Congress
is free to amend the federal settlement acts in a manner that would more
thoughtfully reflect the current federal policy of self-determination, it is not
required to do so. What the UNDRIP offers is the legal and moral incentive
to examine the inequities of this treatment by providing a normative and legal
framework for how the settlements acts must change.
The settlement acts should be amended to ensure that each of the four
Maine Indian tribes' rights to self-government are fully recognized. This
means that the Micmacs and Maliseets would retain the authority to manage
their governmental-employee relationships, that each tribe would be able to
regulate on-reservation activities impacting their lands and natural resources,
and that Maine would be required to consult and seek the consent of the tribes
for off-reservation activities that may impact their lands and natural resources.
169. See generally Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope,
and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 195 (1984).
170. See generally Judith V. Royster, The Legacy ofAllotment, 27 ARZ. ST. L.J. 1, 7-20
(1995).
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But it primarily means that the tribes would have the authority to control their
own destinies, under their own laws and customs.
The history of the Maine tribes and the settlements they received
unfortunately contrast with that of other tribes across the United States. The
Maine tribes, however, are federally recognized and deserve not only the
application and protection of federal Indian law principles in interpreting laws
specific to them, but also the protection of their international human rights as
articulated in the UNDRIP. As demonstrated above, the right to self-
determination and the duty to consult reiterate rights that already exist in
United States law. The settlement acts, as interpreted by Maine and the courts,
infringe upon these rights, preventing the tribes from fully taking ownership
of their own destinies. Given Maine's and the United States' support for the
UNDRIP, the two governments, along with the tribal governments, should
revisit and improve the settlement acts to ensure that the Maine tribes' rights
are respected and upheld.
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